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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a new approach to obtain unbiased estimates of the value of a statistical 
life (VSL) with labor market data. Investigating job changes, we combine the advantages of 
recent panel studies, which allow to control for unobserved heterogeneity of workers, and 
conventional cross-sectional estimations, which primarily exploit the variation of wage and 
risk between different jobs. We find a VSL of 6.1 million euros from pooled cross-sectional 
estimation, 1.9 million euros from the static first-differences panel model and 3.5 million 
euros from the job-changer specification. Thus, ignoring individual heterogeneity causes 
overestimates of the VSL, whereas identifying the wage-risk tradeoff not only by means of 
between job variation (job-changer model) but also on the basis of noisy variation on the job 
(panel models) may lead to underestimates of the VSL. Our results can be used to perform 
cost-benefit analyses of public projects aimed at reducing fatality risks, e.g., in the domains of 
health, environmental or traffic policy. 
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Studies of the value of a statistical life (VSL) using labor market data are
almost exclusively based on cross-sectional data and thus cannot account
for unobserved heterogeneity of workers by exploiting the time dimension
of the data set.1 Only very recently, two panel studies - one for the US
(Kniesner, Viscusi, Woock, & Ziliak, 2005) and one for Germany (Spengler,
2004) - have begun to ﬁll this research gap. Although performed for diﬀerent
countries, the studies ﬁnd very similar results: if unobserved heterogeneity is
controlled for with suitable econometric techniques, such as ﬁxed-eﬀects or
ﬁrst-diﬀerences estimation, the VSL turns out to be at least 50% lower com-
pared to pooled time series cross-section estimates. Not only do these results
call the reliability of former VSL-studies into question, they also provide new
evidence on the ongoing theoretical debate on the direction of the potential
bias in VSL studies if unobserved individual heterogeneity or productivity is
ignored. The existing evidence suggests that the inﬂuence of diﬀerences in
workers’ unobserved risk-related productivity, which Shogren and Stamland
(2002) demonstrate to be a source of upward bias of the VSL, is empirically
more important than general diﬀerences in unobserved productivity, which
impose a downward bias (Hwang, Reed, & Hubbard, 1992).
Although making an important point concerning the direction of a po-
1Older studies investigating the VSL with US panel data controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity failed to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of the fatal risk variable presumably because
they have used too rough risk measures (an example is the study of Brown, 1980).
4tential bias, the studies by Spengler (2004) and Kniesner et al. (2005) run
the risk of potentially underestimating the VSL because a ﬁrst-diﬀerence or
within-transformation of the data leads not only to an elimination of time-
constant individual heterogeneity, but also eliminates the cross-sectional vari-
ation, which reﬂects compensating wage diﬀerentials in a pure sense, e.g., the
diﬀerence in wage and risk levels of a scaﬀolder and a secretary. What domi-
nates the identiﬁcation of the focal eﬀect is the within-group variation, which
stems from risk changes in a given occupation as time goes by and from job
changes of a given worker to a riskier or more secure job. Whereas - putting
aside selectivity problems of job changes - the latter variation is of the same
quality as the eliminated cross-group information, the former is less likely to
be suitable for identifying compensating wage diﬀerentials, because it can-
not be simply assumed that for a given worker in a given job actual wage
adjustments are made for small changes in risk (perhaps only observed by
the researcher). More importantly, there might be spurious negative corre-
lation between wage and risk if third variables (e.g. time dummies) do not
fully capture the general trend towards higher real wages and less riskier
jobs. Thus, focusing on job changes would be a promising approach to ﬁlter
out that part of within-group variation which is presumably more suitable
to identify compensating wage diﬀerentials and, at the same time, not to
renounce controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.2
2To our knowledge the present paper is the ﬁrst English language contribution assessing
the VSL focusing on job changes. Job changes were ﬁrst used by the authors to estimate
the VSL in a German language paper based on diﬀerent data (Schaﬀner & Spengler, 2005).
In parallel working Kniesner, Viscusi, Woock, and Ziliak (2006) also present VSL estimates
5With respect to our preferred (5-year) fatality risk measure we ﬁnd point
estimates for the VSL of 6.1 million euros on average from cross-sectional esti-
mations, 1.9 million euros from the static ﬁrst-diﬀerences panel model and 3.5
million euros from the job-changer speciﬁcation. This result is in accordance
with our assessment that focusing on job changers combines the advantages
from cross-sectional and panel estimation. Moreover, the job-changer esti-
mates are more robust with respect to the choice of the risk measure and,
thus, less sensitive to measurement error in the main explanatory variable.
Although we corroborate the ﬁndings of Spengler (2004) and Kniesner et
al. (2005) that controlling for individual heterogeneity yields lower VSL-
estimates compared to the conventional approach, we ﬁnd smaller reductions
than these studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a
brief introduction of the theory of compensating wage diﬀerentials, presents
the econometric models employed in the empirical analysis and discusses
misspeciﬁcation issues. Section 3 presents our data sets and develops the
fatality risk measures. The empirical results for conventional cross-sectional
estimations, various panel-estimations and estimations for job changers follow
in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
based on job changers and job changes.
62. Unbiased Estimation of the VSL with Labor Market Data
The labor market is the most prominent ﬁeld to study tradeoﬀs between
money and fatality risks in order to estimate the VSL. The underlying the-
ory of compensating wage diﬀerentials (for details see Thaler and Rosen
(1975) or Viscusi (1993)) is developed in a simple model in which the wage
is exclusively determined as a function of the occupational fatality risk, with
workers’ indiﬀerence curves having a (usually increasing) positive slope indi-
cating that higher risks are only accepted in exchange for higher wages, and
ﬁrms’ iso-proﬁt curves having a (decreasing) positive slope indicating that
higher levels of safety are only provided in exchange for wage reductions. In
such a model the VSL equals the (positive) slope of the expansion path of
points of tangency between workers indiﬀerence curves and ﬁrms iso-proﬁt
curves.3
The slope of the expansion path can be estimated using information on
wages and risk available in suitable individual labor market data sets. In
order to identify the wage-risk tradeoﬀ, all other relevant factors have to be
controlled for in a hedonic (i.e. quality-adjusted) wage regression. Such a
3This equality can be demonstrated with the following example: Assume the expansion
path is linear (i.e., that the wage-risk tradeoﬀs are the same in all points of tangency
between indiﬀerence and iso-proﬁt curves) and contains the points (p1 =0 .0005, w1 =
20,000) for worker 1 and (p2 =0 .001, w2 =2 2 ,000) for worker 2 with p representing
risk and w indicating annual wage. These ﬁgures imply a slope of the expansion path of
(
22,000−20,000
0.001−0.0005 =) 4,000,000 and also that worker 1 (and also worker 2) would accept an
increase in his fatality risk by 1
100,000 (which we assume to be marginal) if and only if the
employer would increase his wage by( 1
100,000 × 4,000,000 =)4 0e.P r o v i d e d p o i n t ( p1,
w1) not only represents one individual but 100,000 workers, the latter would demand an
aggregate amount of 4 million e in order to accept one almost certain additional case of
death out of their group. Thus, the VSL and the slope of the expansion path are identical.
7hedonic wage regression can be written as
wi = αpi + xiβ + ui, (1)
where wi i st h ew a g eo fw o r k e ri, pi stands for the workers occupational
fatality risk, xi represents a 1 × K vector of personal characteristics of the
worker as well as characteristics of his job, and ui an error term. Among
the coeﬃcients of the equation, which are depicted in Greek letters, α is
the one of central interest because it represents the slope of the wage-risk
expansion path and, thus, the VSL. What is usually estimated in empirical
VSL studies using cross sectional data, however, is not equation (1) but
rather a modiﬁcation which can be written as
lnwij = α
CSpj + xijβ + uij. (2)
Apart from the purely technical fact that the dependent variable enters
the equation as a natural logarithm in order to correct for outliers in the wage
data, an index j representing the occupation and/or industry of a worker has
been added to all variables. The fatality risk no longer has an index i. This
accounts for the fact that worker speciﬁc risk information is usually not avail-
able to the researcher. Instead, mean risks by occupation and/or industry
from oﬃcial statistics are used as proxies. In order to obtain unbiased esti-
mates for αCS from equation (2) the approximation of the job risk perceived
by the individual through aggregate data has to be accurate and pj must be
8uncorrelated with uij. Provided the ﬁrst condition can be fulﬁlled by using
suﬃciently detailed occupational/industry risk data, the validity of the sec-
ond condition has been questioned by the theoretical papers of Hwang et al.
(1992) and Shogren and Stamland (2002).4
Hwang et al. (1992) argue that unobserved diﬀerences in individual pro-
ductivity, e.g. intelligence, motivation or ability to cope with pressure, may
create a severe downward bias of estimations of the wage-risk tradeoﬀ. If
productivity diﬀerences are introduced into the model of compensating wage
diﬀerentials, those workers with an above average productivity - among those
workers sharing the same risk preference - would realize higher wages for a
given risk level or lower risk for the same wage. Thus, productivity diﬀerences
create a dispersion of wage-risk choices of workers away from the theoretical
wage-risk expansion path. Provided this dispersion is strong relative to the
desired wage-risk variation along the expansion path and a signiﬁcant part
of the productivity diﬀerences can not be observed by the researcher, coeﬃ-
cients of the risk variable in a hedonic wage regression will be biased against
zero or even carry an unexpected negative sign.
4Apart from unobserved productivity the condition of uncorrelatedness between fatal
risk measure and error term can also be violated if other unpleasant job characteristics like
dirt, noise, heat or shift work are omitted as regressors. If these disamenities are positively
correlated with the fatality risk and also compensated by the employer their omission
w o u l dr e s u l ti na nu p w a r db i a so ft h ee ﬀ e c to ft h ef a t a l i t yr a t e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,w ec a n
not control for these factors in the empirical analysis because they are not observed in our
data set. We did run estimations in which besides the fatality rate the non fatal accident
risk was included as an explanatory variable. Whilst in cross-sectional estimations we
often obtained unexpected negative signiﬁcant eﬀects for the non-fatality risk with partly
substantial increases of the coeﬃcients of the fatality rate the eﬀects in the panel and job
changer models were small and mostly insigniﬁcant (results available on request). From
this ﬁnding we conclude that the eﬀect of the fatality risk is relatively robust to omissions
of other occupational disamenities - at least as far as our preferred models are concerned.
9In contrast to general productivity, Garen (1988) and Shogren and Stam-
land (2002) make risk-speciﬁc productivity a subject of discussion. Risk-
speciﬁc productivity is a feature of workers which - for example as a result
of cool-headedness or good physical agility - enables them to be more pro-
ductive in hazardous professions than "normal" workers, whilst playing no
role in nonhazardous jobs. Therefore, workers who are highly skilled in han-
dling risk select themselves into more risky occupations in which they have
a comparative wage advantage. If risk-speciﬁc productivity is not observed
by the researcher, the positive correlation between risk-speciﬁc productivity
and the fatality-risk measure on the one hand, and risk-speciﬁc productivity
and wages on the other, will lead to an upward bias of the coeﬃcient of the
fatality-risk measure in a hedonic wage regression.
Usually, neither all facets of risk-speciﬁc productivity nor of productivity
in general are observed in labor market data sets. Therefore, conventional
cross-sectional studies have only produced unbiased VSL-estimates if the
diﬀerently signed biases described above have exactly cancelled each other
out. As this is unlikely to be the case, more reﬁned estimation techniques and
more informative data sets are needed. Shogren and Stamland (2006), for
instance, propose a GMM approach on cross-sectional data which, however, is
costly because the required data is not available an, thus, has to be especially
collected. A less costly alternative is to exploit the panel structure of existing
data sets.
10As is well known, the ﬁxed-eﬀects and ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimator allow to
control at least for that part of unobserved heterogeneity which is constant
over time. The random-eﬀects model has the advantage that regressors may
be time-invariant or weakly time-variant. Since our main regressor - the fa-
tality rate - exhibits suﬃcient variation over time, this feature of the random-
eﬀects model is not decisive for the model choice.5 It is rather the fact that
the random-eﬀects model requires the absence of correlation between the un-
observed eﬀect (which is part of the error term in the random-eﬀects model)
and the explanatory variables. Since this condition is obviously not met for
the fatality rate the random-eﬀects model is not suitable for our empirical
analysis.
Deciding between the ﬁxed-eﬀects and the ﬁrst-diﬀerence model for T>2
(for T =2the models yield identical results) is not an easy task (see the per-
tinent discussion in Wooldridge, 2002). In the context of the present study,
there are three reasons why we prefer the ﬁrst-diﬀerence model. First, if the
wage and risk variables are integrated of order one, ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the data
will render the series stationary and avoid the spurious regression problem.
Second, if dynamic misspeciﬁcation of the static ﬁxed-eﬀects model requires
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor, ﬁrst-diﬀerencing
the data is necessary in any case (in combination with a suitable instrumenta-
tion of the lagged dependent variable) in order to obtain unbiased parameter
estimates. Third, the ﬁrst-diﬀerence model is technically equivalent to the
5Actually, the only time-constant variable in our empirical analysis is nationality.
11job changer model presented below and, thus, more suitable for comparisons
of VSL-estimates.6 The ﬁrst-diﬀerence model can be written as
∆lnwijt = α
FD∆pjt +∆ xijtβ + λt +∆ uijt, (3)
where t is an index for the calendar year and ∆ is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence
operator implying, for instance, that ∆lnwijt = lnwijt − lnwi,j−1,t−1, with
j − 1 representing the occupation of worker i in period t − 1. The 1 × T
vector of time dummies λt is not diﬀerenced since ﬁrst-diﬀerencing would
have the implausible implication that all time eﬀects are completely undone
in the following year.
Controlling for individual heterogeneity by performing a ﬁrst-diﬀerence
(or within) transformation of the data comes at the cost of eliminating
cross-sectional variation of variables and identiﬁcation of parameters relying
heavily on within-variation (i.e., variation of variables across time). Within-
variation of the occupational fatality rate may be due to changes in risk on
the job (i.e., in a given occupation) or changes in risk resulting from job
changes. It is the former type of variation which may complicate our empir-
ical task of accurately estimating the wage-risk-tradeoﬀ. On the one hand,
it is not plausible to assume that (presumably very small) year to year on-
the-job changes in fatality risk - especially if they are not noticed by the
workers or due to random rather than actual variations - will be reﬂected in
6In spite of our preference for the ﬁrst-diﬀerence model, we also present the results
from ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation.
12systematic wage variations corresponding with the theory of compensating
wage diﬀerentials. On the other hand the general tendency towards rising
real wages (due to productivity gains) and falling fatality risks (due to con-
tinuous improvements in industrial safety) could create a spurious negative
relationship between risk and wage if third variables in a regression do not
fully absorb these trends.7 If relevant, both sources of within-variation of
risk on the job will bias estimates of the wage risk tradeoﬀ downwards.
Another shortcoming of the ﬁrst-diﬀerence (and ﬁxed-eﬀects) estimator
is that only time constant individual heterogeneity can be controlled for.
This may become a problem if the panel is rather long (as in our study,
where T =1 1 ) since only few unobserved characteristics of the person can be
perceived to be really time constant - one example being intelligence. Others
however, like motivation or ability to cope with risk may well change over
time. As a consequence, we propose a model making lower demands on the
time constance of individual heterogeneity and circumventing the problem of
"unwanted" within variation of risk on the job. This model, which can be
written as
∆lnwijt = α
JC∆pjt + zijtγ + λt +∆ uijt,j  =( j − 1), (4)
diﬀers from the ﬁrst-diﬀerence model with respect to only considering ob-
7In our data set the mean real gross wage per day (in prices of 2004) of male blue collar
workers increased from 78.00 e in 1985 to 83.70 e in 1995, whilst the mean occupational
fatality rate decreased from 10 to 8 deathly work accidents per 100,000 fulltime man years
over the same period.
13servations for which j  =( j − 1), i.e., the focus is on observations from
consecutive years / cutoﬀ dates t − 1 and t for which diﬀerent occupations
are reported for worker i.M o r e o v e r ,∆x is replaced with a more informative
vector of control variables z.8
Exclusively considering the more promising wage-risk variation across
jobs and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the job changer model
combines the advantages from the cross-sectional and ﬁrst-diﬀerence model.
Actually, the former model is an even more promising approach to handle
unobserved heterogeneity than the latter, since time constance of unobserved
eﬀects is only required for those years in which a job change takes place.9
Furthermore, since repeated observations for individual workers are the ex-
ception in the job changer model, it is likely to be less aﬀected by problems
of dynamic misspeciﬁcation than conventional panel data models.10
From the preceding discussion we can capture a working hypothesis con-
cerning the size of the risk coeﬃcients from diﬀerent estimators. Since poten-
tial downward biases of the risk eﬀect from ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimation are not
relevant for the job changer model, we expect αJC >α FD. Whether estimates
considering individual heterogeneity will be smaller (αCS >α JC >α FD)o r
8Whilst, for instance, ∆x would contain a composite indicator for the change of marital
status (taking on the value "1" in the case of marriage, "-1" in the case of divorce and "0"
otherwise) z contains separate indicators for marriage and divorce and, therefore, allows
for more ﬂexibility of the model.
9Even if a worker has changed his job several times in the sample period individual
heterogeneity may change over time as long as it is constant for the respective pairs of
cutoﬀ dates on the basis of which the diﬀerences in equation 4 are calculated.
10In our sample 18,000 workers perform 23,000 job changes. In contrast to this the
conventional panel estimates are based on more than 500,000 observations from 88,000
w o r k e r s( s e eT a b l e s2a n d6 ) .
14larger (αJC >α FD >α CS) than conventional cross-sectional estimates, how-
ever, remains an open question which can only be determined empirically.
3. Data and the Fatality Risk Measure
A labor-market data set, on the basis of which the VSL is to be examined,
must contain reliable wage information and as many variables as possible
which have a potential inﬂuence on wages. Apart from variables like age,
gender and education, that are usually contained in labor-market datasets,
further factors inﬂuencing wages - which have been discussed in the preced-
ing section - are, for instance, intelligence, motivation and coolheadedness.
Standard labor market data generally have no information on the latter indi-
cators. In order to be able to take account of the time constant components
of these unobserved variables, panel data is helpful. The most important
explanatory variable in a VSL study is the individual’s fatality risk in the
workplace. As such a variable is usually also not included in a labor-market
data set, the latter must at least feature suitable interfaces by means of which
aggregated risk data from other sources may be incorporated. Where it is
the case that indicators of occupation (and/or industrial sector) can be found
both in the labor-market and in the risk data set and where these indica-
tors possess compatible characteristic values in both data sets, the individual
labor market data and the aggregated risk data can be merged. In this sec-
tion we ﬁrst present our labor market data followed by an introduction of
15the occupational risk data. Finally, we describe how both data sources are
combined and the fatality risk measure is calculated.
3.1 Labor Market Data
Our labor market data set is the IABS - the Employment Subsample of the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB)11, which is available for researchers
as a scientiﬁc use ﬁle. The IABS is a 1% random sample of German employ-
ees subject to compulsory social security contributions. It covers the period
1975–1995 including 560,000 individuals in total and approx. 200,000 indi-
viduals per year.12 Not included in the IABS are the self-employed, civil
servants, judges, professional soldiers, military and community-service con-
scripts, the marginally employed, full-time students and unpaid family work-
ers, because none of these groups is subject to compulsory social security
contributions. According to the data description by Bender and Haas (2002,
pp. 8), in 1995 employment statistics on the base of which the IABS is
randomly selected covers approx. 79% of the working population in West-
11The Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufs-
forschung [IAB]) is the research institute of the German Federal Employment Service
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit).
12There also exists a more current version of the IABS covering the period 1975–2001
(IABS regional sample). Apart from additional years, this sample does also contain re-
gional information on the county level (the only regional information contained in the
1975–1995 sample is a dummy variable distinguishing East and West Germany.) This
additional information comes at the cost of signiﬁcantly reducing the number of charac-
teristic values of some variables in order to avoid identiﬁcation of anonymized individuals.
The most crucial impact of this security policy for the present analysis is the reduction
of characteristic values of the occupation variable from 335 (1975–1995 sample) to 130
(1975–2001 regional sample). Since our aim is to achieve the best possible approximation
of individual occupational risk with mean risks by occupation, we prefer more detailed
occupational to more detailed regional information.
16Germany, and approx. 86% of the working population in East-Germany. For
all employees covered by the employment statistics, the following personal
and professional characteristics are available: gender, year of birth, marital
status, number of children, citizenship, exact start and end date of an oc-
cupation, schooling and job training, professional status (including details
on full and part-time occupation), gross wage, industry of the employer and
total number of employees of the employer. Finally, a variable indicating the
occupation of a worker is included. This variable is coded according to the 3-
digit classiﬁcation of occupations of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce from 1975,
which normally has 334 characteristic values. In order to avoid identiﬁcation
of individuals some occupations are summarized in the IABS reducing the
number of characteristic values to 275.
Apart from its large sample size and panel structure, another important
feature making the IABS suitable for investigating compensating wage diﬀer-
entials is its high quality of information concerning dates of commencement
and cessation of employment and, most importantly, gross wages. This is a
result of the IABS being a process-produced data set, i.e. a data set based on
employers’ declarations within the framework of compulsory social-insurance
registration.13 However, not all variables included in the IABS are of high
13The German social security registration procedure is organized as follows: Employ-
ers are obliged to report information about their employees - above all exact dates of
commencement and cessation of employment and gross wages but also supplementary in-
formation (see above) - on a regular basis to the three main branches of the social security
system so that entitlements to sickness, pension, unemployment and other social beneﬁts
can be determined. At ﬁrst, the information is sent to health insurance companies, who
forward it to the pension insurance who, ﬁnally, forward the data to the unemployment
insurance. Since in contrast to health and pension insurance, unemployment insurance
17quality. Erroneous information is most likely to appear in the case of vari-
ables having no direct relevance to social security contributions (e.g. marital
status, number of children, education) and which are reported for statistical
purposes only by company staﬀ who do not always take due care. Since there
is no sign of selectivity in the errors of these variables they should at most
cause a bias of the corresponding coeﬃcients against zero in hedonic wage
regressions.14
Panel attrition, which is a problem in labor market data sets based on
surveys, does also aﬀect the IABS but in a diﬀerent way. The IABS does not
lose those individuals who are simply unwilling to participate in interviews
but rather those who leave jobs which are subject to compulsory social se-
curity contributions (without changing to registered unemployment) or who
lose their eligibility for unemployment beneﬁts (without being reemployed in
a job subject to compulsory social security contributions). Examples of panel
attrition in the IABS are people becoming self-employed or civil servants or
who fall out of the labor force. Besides being restricted to the workforce
subject to compulsory social-insurance contributions, further disadvantages
of the IABS are to be found in the censoring of wage ﬁgures at the assessment
is centralized in one organization, the Federal Employment Agency holds records on all
individual employment spells in Germany as far as they concern times of legal occupation
subject to social insurance contribution. These records in combination with information
about times of registered unemployment (also centrally maintained by the Federal Em-
ployment Agency) form the basis of the IABS.
14Number of children, however, is of such a bad quality that Bender, Hilzendegen, Ro-
hwer, and Rudolph (1996) in their data description recommend its exclusion from empirical
studies.
18ceiling.15 Overall, approximately 10% of the wage ﬁgures in the IABS are
censored. This percentage becomes substantially lower if, as in the following
analysis, the focus is on male blue-collar workers, for whom only 2% of the
wage ﬁgures are censored.
The individual level data of the IABS consist of employment (and un-
employment) spells. Spells are deﬁned by the beginning and the end of a
person’s employment with a speciﬁc employer/ﬁrm, or by beginning or end
of an period of unemployment. For some workers (the sum of) these spells
may cover the whole sample period (1975–1995), for others only few and
short spells may be observed. In the empirical analysis weuse an (unbal-
anced) yearly panel data set for the period 1985–1995 with the last day of
the year (December 31) being the cut-oﬀ date.16 Thus, the processed data
set contains a maximum of one observation per year for each individual and
a maximum of 11 observations for each individual across the sample period
1985–1995.
15The assessment ceiling deﬁnes a wage level up to which contributions to social security
have to be paid proportional to the actual wage. The assessment ceiling is subject to
annual adjustment. For wages exceeding the actual assessment ceiling in a given year the
quantity of social security contributions equals the social security contribution rate times
the assessment ceiling. Since pension insurance has the highest threshold levels among
all social security insurances, the wage ﬁgures in the IABS are censored at that threshold
level which was 33,132 euros in 1985, 47,857 euros in 1995 and 62,400 euros in 2005 (in
prices of the respective year) (Wikipedia, 2006).
16We have to restrict the analysis to the period 1985–1995 because of the limited avail-
ability of risk data (see next subsection) .
193.2 Occupational Accident Data
As the IABS contains no data on the individual risk of suﬀering injury to
life and limb in the course of working activities, information about occupa-
tional accidents has to be obtained from a diﬀerent source. To this end, the
statutory regulations on social insurance can be again availed of. Whilst the
IABS is a result of the registration procedure for health, pension, and unem-
ployment insurance, representative data on occupational accidents may be
gleaned from the remaining branch of social insurance - statutory accident
insurance (SAI). All accidents at the workplace which lead to an employee’s
death or inability to work for more than three days must be reported by
the employer to the risk-bearing SAI corporation. A decisive feature of this
reporting process is that in addition to the personal information about the
accident victim and the circumstances of the accident the occupation of the
victim is also recorded, in fact - with the exception of the agricultural sector
- according to the same coding scheme as in the IABS.
There exist 80 German SAI corporations which are organized in three
umbrella organizations covering the industrial, public and agricultural sec-
tor, respectively. Since the umbrella organizations collect the micro data of
all their associated SAI corporations, they were the suitable addresses for
our data request. The industrial as well as the public sector SAI umbrella
organization could provide annual data for fatal and non-fatal work accidents
aggregated with respect to the 3-digit occupational code covering the period
201985–1995.17
In keeping with the other social-insurance branches, the SAI does not
cover the entire workforce. Once again, excluded are civil servants, judges
and soldiers, whose risk of accident at work is safeguarded directly by their
employer, which is the (federal) state. The self-employed outside the agricul-
tural sector are equally exempt from statutory insurance. They may insure
themselves in the SAI on a voluntary basis. According to the umbrella orga-
nization of the industrial SAI corporations, 1.43 mill. self-employed persons
were insured in its domain as of 31.12.2002 (HVBG, 2003), corresponding to
a share of approx. 40% of all self-employed in Germany. On account of this
partial registration of the self-employed, the SAI covers a greater section of
the labor force than other branches of social insurance and, thus, the IABS.
3.3 Fatality Risk Measure and Estimation Sample
In order to obtain an occupational risk measure for the subsequent empirical
analysis, it is necessary to put absolute occupational accident frequencies
(from the SAI) in relation to ﬁgures indicating the quantity of employment
in the respective professions. We, therefore, deﬁne our fatality risk measure
17Data was also made available by the agricultural SAI umbrella organization. This
data, however, could not be used in the empirical analysis because the internal coding
scheme of the agricultural SAI corporations is not compatible with the classiﬁcation of
occupations of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce. As a consequence, we had to exclude all
observations from individuals in agricultural occupations from our analysis.
21as follows:
pjt =
Number of Fatal Work Accidentsjt
Number of Fulltime Equivalent Workersjt
. (5)
The information needed to assess the denominator of the equation can be
calculated using the original (i.e. unprocessed) version of the IABS because
it contains the exact duration of employment spells (number of days) of
workers in a speciﬁc occupation and year as well as information on part-
time work. Aggregating working days adjusted for daily working hours by
occupation yields the occupation speciﬁc working quantity according to the
IABS which - since the IABS is a 1% random sample of the entire German
working population - must simply be multiplied by 100 and divided by 365
in order to obtain the number of fulltime equivalent workers.
Table 1 depicts the correspondingly calculated fatality risks with respect
to the 10 most dangerous occupations in Germany - excluding occupations
in the agricultural sector and occupations (mainly) exercised by workers not
subject to compulsory social security beneﬁts (e.g. policemen, ﬁreﬁghters,
judges, attorneys of state, teachers, entrepreneurs). Allmost all of these
occupations are construction, navigation or mining occupations. In the sub-
sequent section we use this indicator as an explanatory variable in hedonic
wage regressions in order to determine the VSL.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for our estimation sample includ-
ing all variables entering the estimations with the exception of 21 industry
22dummies. Like many other VSL studies we restrict our sample to male blue
collar workers. We do this for for two reasons. First, for this subgroup the
actual relevance of compensating wage diﬀerentials is most obvious.18 Sec-
ond, concentrating on male blue collar workers has the advantage that the
problem of wage censoring in the IABS can be neglected, as only two percent
of the blue collar workers earn wages ﬁgures high enough to be censored.
Although restricted to male blue-collar workers, the estimation sample is
still very large, including more than half a million observations from 88,000
workers.
4. Empirical Results
In this section we provide the estimation results of the hedonic wage regres-
sions from equations 2 to 4 for the coeﬃcients of the fatality risk measure
(ˆ α) together with the implied VSL. Since hedonic wage models usually fol-
low a semi-logarithmic speciﬁcation the VSL can only be evaluated at speciﬁc
points of the wage distribution. We follow the convention of reporting the
VSL at the mean wage. Moreover, assessing the VSL from ˆ α the dimensions
of the fatality risk measure (fatality risk per 1,000 workers in our case) and
of the wage variable (daily gross wage in our case) have to be taken into
18Work related health risks for white collar workers - such as stress related heart attacks
of managers or radiation induced cancer of pilots and ﬂight attendants - may also be
signiﬁcant but are usually much more diﬃcult to measure than workplace accidents.




=ˆ α × ¯ w × 365 × 1,000. (6)
In addition to estimations with the contemporary fatality rate according
to equation 5, we also perform estimations with an alternative risk measure
(5-year-fatality rate) which has the advantage of being more robust to nor-
mal ﬂuctuations or outliers in the incidence of fatal occupational accidents
and may, thus, be a more precise approximation of the actual danger at the





t−4 pt. Since we need the actual through the four year
lagged value of pt in order to construct p5
t, the estimation period is reduced
to 1989–1995.
Table 3 shows a summary of conventional VSL estimates based on cross-
sectional and pooled estimation. Cross-sectional estimates with the contem-
porary (annual) fatality rate turn out to have a wide range (3.3–8 million
euros) and a median of 4.4 million euros which, not surprisingly, is very close
to the VSL from the pooled estimation for the whole sample (4.5 million
euros). VSL estimates based on the alternative risk measure exhibit less
variation (4.5–7.6 million euros) and a higher median (6.4 million euros).
This result suggests that the contemporary fatality rate is a less precise ap-
proximation of the actual (individual) risk at the workplace than a measure
19Since deathly workplace accidents are rare events small changes in absolute numbers
(especially in occupations with relatively few workers) may cause substantial ﬂuctuations
in the fatality rate.
24combining and smoothing fatality rates from various years.20
The ﬁxed-eﬀects and ﬁrst-diﬀerence panel estimates controlling for un-
observed worker heterogeneity are reported in Table 4. In these models the
cross-sectional diﬀerences in the levels of the variables are canceled out and
the estimation of the coeﬃcients relies mainly on within worker variation.
In this case the inﬂuence of measurement errors in the risk variable becomes
much larger compared with cross-sectional estimates. The VSL derived from
estimates with the contemporary risk measure (ranging from 0.2 to 1.5 mil-
lion euros) are much smaller than the estimates using the 5-year fatality rate
(ranging from 1.6 to 2.8 million euros).
The fact that each point estimate reported in Table 4 (regardless of the
choice of risk measure) is substantially smaller than the corresponding result
from pooled estimation in Table 3 is a ﬁrst hint that ignoring unobserved
worker heterogeneity leads to overestimates of the VSL. However, most of the
results displayed in Table 4 should be interpreted with caution. Fixed-eﬀects
estimates, for instance, might be biased if variables are non-stationary.21 A
further source of inconsistency - ﬁrst discussed by Nickell (1981) - arises if a
lagged dependent variable is added as a regressor, as in the dynamic ﬁxed-
eﬀects model. The Nickel bias might be tackled by instrumental variable
estimation techniques proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1997) and Arellano
20It is interesting to note that the median of the VSL estimates with the 5-year fatality
rate is not far away from the median (of $7 million) from 30 US cross-sectional labor
market based VSL studies surveyed by Viscusi and Aldy (2003).
21Indeed, there exists evidence that wages in Germany follow an I(1) process (Breitung
& Meyer, 1994).
25and Bond (1991). However, none of our Anderson-Hsiao or Arellano-Bond
estimations passed the test of over-identifying restrictions implying that the
(necessary) instrumentation of the lagged dependent variable is invalid.22
As a consequence the static ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimator might be the best
choice since, due to ﬁrst-diﬀerencing of the data, I(1) series are turned into
I(0) series. The quality of the estimation results might nevertheless be ques-
tionable if the model is subject to dynamic misspeciﬁcation. If - as in our
case - tests of autocorrelation of the residual yield signiﬁcant results, the
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor might be
in order. This, however, confronts us with the dynamic panel estimators
mentioned above and their speciﬁc problems.
Apart from the problem to determine the best alternative among a variety
of panel estimators, there might be a more general problem of investigating
compensating wage diﬀerentials with panel data. This problem can best be
demonstrated by means of Table 5. In the upper panel of the table we present
results from panel estimations exclusively based on workers who did not
change their job in the IABS. As can be inferred from the small negative and
mostly insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, the within variation of wage and risk on the
job is not systematic and obviously biases the VSL downwards. Evidence for
this presumption can be directly gathered from the comparison of the results
from Table 4 with the results from the lower panel of Table 5. The latter stem
22The dynamic ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 were obtained using
the Arellano-Bond technic.
26from a sample restricted to workers who have experienced at least one job
change. Restricting the sample in this way removes a substantial fraction of
noisy within variation and substantially increases the VSL-estimates across
all speciﬁcations. The noisy within variation is due to variation in risk which
results of technological progress but also of measurement error. On the other
side real wages vary across time (there is a rise in real wages over time).
These variations are not based on the changes in the risk variable. It is
remarkable that the increase in the VSL is stronger for the estimates based on
the contemporary risk measure compared with the estimates based the 5-year
fatality rate. Obviously, the bias of measurement error and this independent
variation of risk and wages is higher using the contemporary risk.
Although the estimates presented in the lower panel of Table 5 are exclu-
sively based on those individuals who changed their job at least once there
remains a larger number of observations which stems from years in which
the workers remained in the same job. The wage/risk variation contained
in these (pairs of) observations may still be a source of bias. Consequently,
we go a step further and restrict our analysis to pairs of observations sur-
rounding a job change of a certain worker. On the basis of these observations
we create ﬁrst diﬀerences of the variables (see equation 4) analogous to the
ﬁrst-diﬀerences panel models. There remain 24,296 observations (diﬀerences)
of almost 18,000 workers in the new estimation sample. Selected summary
statistics are presented in Table 6. These job changes are associated with a
27mean real pay increase of almost 3 euros. 60% of the job changes are per-
formed by workers aged 20 to 35, while only 42% of the whole sample (see
Table 2) are in this age group.
In addition to estimating the model of job changes with the lagged fatality
rate and suitable representations of the other time-variant variables, we also
add the levels of some variables like age, nationality and work experience
(which are either time-invariant or have time-invariant diﬀerences) to the
set of regressors. We also add time dummies and an indicator if there was a
period of unemployment between two observations surrounding a job change.
Our decision to include these additional variables is based on the fact that job
changes have very diﬀerent reasons which we do not directly observe in our
data set. For instance, it is straightforward to assume that advancements in
jobs are involved with wage increases while job changes because of dismissals
do not result in signiﬁcant wage increases or even in wage decreases. Another
reasonable assumption may be that job changes of younger workers are more
often aimed at salary increase whilst changes of older workers might more
often be driven by the threat of unemployment or early retirement programs.
The estimated coeﬃcients and the corresponding VSL of the regressions
exclusively based on job changes are presented in Table 7. The point esti-
mates of the VSL equal 2.8 million euros for the contemporary and 3.5 million
euros for the 5-year fatality rate. These results have three implications. First,
removing the remaining within variation which is not based on job changes
28and which is potentially noisy does further increase the VSL conﬁrming our
hypothesis from Section 2 that αJC >α FD. Second, we provide further ev-
idence that it is rather an overestimation than an underestimation of the
VSL which results if unobserved individual heterogeneity is not controlled
for (i.e., αCS >α JC >α FD). Finally, the downward bias of the VSL due to
measurement error in the risk variable is larger in speciﬁcations relying more
heavily on within variation which is not caused by job changes.
5. Conclusion
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in hedonic wage studies of the value
of a statistical life (VSL) has not played a role for a long time. Only very
recently two panel studies (Spengler, 2004 and Kniesner et al., 2005) were
successful in controlling for time constant components of unobserved het-
erogeneity using random eﬀects, ﬁxed-eﬀects and ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimators.
The implied VSL from these studies turns out to be at least 50% lower than
conventional cross-sectional estimates. This result might be explained by
the dominance of an upward bias of the VSL due to neglecting risk related
skills / productivity (see the theoretical work of Shogren & Stamland, 2002)
relative to a downward bias inﬂicted by unobserved productivity in general
(see the theoretical work of Hwang et al., 1992).
Performing ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimations exclusively on the basis of pairs of
observations surrounding a job change of a certain worker, this paper presents
29an alternative approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity, which we
assess to be favorable to standard panel estimators for at least three reasons
- especially if the time dimension of the data set is relatively long (e.g. if
T =1 1 , as in the present study). First, identiﬁcation of compensating wage
diﬀerentials does not hinge on (obviously) noisy within worker variation of
wage and risk on the job. Second, in order to be fully controlled for, this
individual productivity is only required to be constant for the year of a job
change. Third, issues of dynamic misspeciﬁcation of the econometric model
are largely irrelevant.
With respect to our preferred (5-year) fatality risk measure, we ﬁnd point
estimates for the VSL of 3.5 million euros from the job-changer speciﬁcation,
1.9 million euros from the static ﬁrst-diﬀerences panel model and an me-
dian of 6.4 million euros from conventional cross sectional estimations. Thus
focusing on job changes yields substantially higher VSL estimates than the
most closely paralleling panel model. We attribute this result to the omission
of within variation, i.e. variation of wage and risk which is unspeciﬁc with
respect to the model of compensating wage diﬀerentials and which cannot
be controlled for with third variables. Moreover, the estimates based on job
changers/changes are more robust with respect to the choice of the risk mea-
sure and, thus, less sensitive to measurement error in the focal explanatory
variable.
Although we corroborate the ﬁndings of Spengler (2004) and Kniesner
30et al. (2005) that controlling for individual heterogeneity yields lower VSL-
estimates compared with the conventional cross-sectional approach, we ﬁnd
that the reduction is at most 50% rather than at least 50% because estimates
exclusively based on job changes yield higher VSL than conventional panel
estimates. Our results can be used to perform (more reliable) cost-beneﬁt-
analysis of public projects aimed to reduce fatality risks, e.g., in the domains
of health, environmental or traﬃc policy.
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32Table 1: Annual occupational fatality risk per 1.000 fulltime-equivalent-man-
years of the 10 most dangerous occupations, 1985-1995
Rank Occupation (3-digit) Mean Std. Min. Max.
Dev.
1 Scaﬀolders 0.798 0.364 0.186 1.56
2 Inland waters navigator / 0.714 0.249 0.348 1.10
Sundry waterways occupations
3 Deckhands 0.681 0.428 0.135 1.37
4 Nautical navigators 0.513 0.334 0.155 1.07
5 Roofers, slaters 0.418 0.128 0.179 0.610
6 Miners 0.361 0.132 0.146 0.653
7 Machine, electrical and shot colliers 0.331 0.254 0.000 0.945
8 Air traﬃc occupations 0.290 0.225 0.000 0.732
9 Blasters / Sundry civil engineering occupations 0.277 0.069 0.125 0.404
10 Excavator drivers 0.267 0.097 0.110 0.406
33Table 2: Selected Summary Statistics
Mean Standard
Deviation
Gross daily wage (in euro from 2004) 81.5 20.4














With any vocational qualiﬁcation 0.726 0.446
Professional position
Non-skilled worker 0.371 0.483
Skilled worker 0.576 0.494
Master craftsman/Foreman 0.053 0.224
Job Tenure (in years) 11.4 5.21
Job Tenure squared 156 116
Job Tenure potentially censored 0.483 0.500
Work experience (in years) 7.49 5.85
Work experience squared 90.4 108
Work experience potentially censored 0.211 0.408
Unemployment preceding in the current year 0.062 0.241
Number of employees






≥ 1.000 0.249 0.432
Fatality rates per 1.000 fulltime-man-years
Annual fatality rate 0.083 0.096
5-year fatality rate 0.082 0.087
Number of observations 553,862
Observations with censored wage 0.021
Number of workers 88,115
34Table 3: Summary of values of a statistical life from cross-sectional and
pooled estimations
Annual fatality rate 5–Year fatality rate
(1985-1995) (1989-1995)
Cross-sectional estimations
Range 3.32 – 8.00 4.50 – 7.64
Mean 4.84 6.26
Median 4.43 6.37
Pooled estimation 4.50 6.07
Notes: The table displays VSL-estimates in million euros. All underlying coeﬃcients of
fatality rates are signiﬁcant at the 1%–level.
Table 4: Values of a statistical life from various panel estimations
Annual fatality rate 5-Year fatality rate
(1985-1995) (1989-1995)
ˆ α VSL ˆ α VSL
Static Fixed-Eﬀects Estimates 0.050 1.49 0.092 2.77
(0.003) (0.007)
Dynamic Fixed-Eﬀects Estimates
Short-Run Eﬀect 0.020 0.62 0.060 1.86
(0.003) (0.007)
Long-Run Eﬀect 0.032 0.97 0.082 2.54
[0.000] [0.000]
Static First-Diﬀerence Estimates 0.007 0.23 0.060 1.87
(0.003) (0.015)
Dynamic First-Diﬀerence Estimates
Short-Run Eﬀect 0.006 0.17 0.051 1.61
(0.003) (0.009)
Long-Run Eﬀect 0.009 0.28 0.083 2.63
[0.102] [0.000]
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null-hypothesis
that the long-run eﬀect is zero are recorded in square brackets. VSL is the implied value
of a statistical life (in 1 million euros) calculated as ˆ α × mean annual income.
35Table 5: Values of a statistical life from various panel estimations
Annual fatality rate 5-Year fatality rate
(1985-1995) (1989-1995)
ˆ α VSL ˆ α VSL
Employees without job change
Static Fixed-Eﬀects Estimates -.0004 -.01 -.0077 -.24
(.0043) (.0144)
Dynamic Fixed-Eﬀects Estimates
Short-Run Eﬀect -.0100 -.31 -.0084 -.26
(.0038) (.0128)
Long-Run Eﬀect -.4851 -.49 -.0115 -.36
[.0078] [.5130]
Static First-Diﬀerence Estimates -.0084 -.26 -.0136 -.43
(.0030) (.0175)
Dynamic First-Diﬀerence Estimates
Short-Run Eﬀect -.0062 -.20 -.0052 -.17
(.0041) (.0201)
Long-Run Eﬀect -.0097 -.31 -.0086 -.27
[.1331] [0.794]
Employees with job change
Static Fixed-Eﬀects Estimates .092 2.64 .113 3.35
(.006) (.009)
Dynamic Fixed-Eﬀects Estimates
Short-Run Eﬀect .048 1.42 .076 2.29
(.005) (.009)
Long-Run Eﬀect .074 2.21 .103 3.11
[.000] [0.00]
Static First-Diﬀerence Estimates .026 .78 .073 2.22
(.006) (.017)
Dynamic First-Diﬀerence Estimates
Short-Run Eﬀect .020 .60 .062 1.90
(.006) (.012)
Long-Run Eﬀect .032 .98 .100 3.10
[0.001] [.000]
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null-hypothesis
that the long-run eﬀect is zero are recorded in square brackets. VSL is the implied value
of a statistical life (in 1 million euros) calculated as ˆ α × mean annual income.
36Table 6: Selected Summary Statistics for Job Changers
Mean Standard
Deviation
Diﬀerence gross daily wage (in euro from 2004) 2.93 14.5
Diﬀerence Log(gross daily wage) 0.045 0.233
Change in marital status
Marriage 0.083 0.276
Divorce 0.042 0.201
Acquirement of vocational training 0.093 0.290
Advancement to ...
...Skilled worker 0.125 0.331
...Master craftsman 0.023 0.149
Relagation to ...
...Unskilled worker 0.146 0.353
...Skilled Worker 0.005 0.071













Work experience (in years) 9.89 5.06
Work experience squared 123 106
Work experience potentially censored 0.327 0.469
Unemployment preceding new job 0.174 0.379
Change in fatality rates per 1.000 fulltime-man-years
Annual fatality rate -0.003 0.126
5-year fatality rate 0.000 0.110
Number of observations 24,296
Observations with censored wage 0.014
Number of workers 17,916
37Table 7: Estimates of the wage-fatal risk tradeoﬀ for job changers
Annual fatality rate 5-Year fatality rate
(1985-1995) (1989-1995)
ˆ α VSL ˆ α VSL
All job changers 0.099 2.79 0.121 3.46
(0.012) (0.019)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. VSL is the implied value of a statistical
life (in 1 million euros) calculated as ˆ α × mean annual income .
38